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Conventional wisdom holds that large margins of electoral victory contribute to presidential power. How does this variation
in power impact U.S. foreign policy? I argue here that presidents who win elections by a substantial margin authorize the
use of substantial military force more regularly, but do so at the expense of personal diplomacy and low-level crisis engage-
ment. This distinction stems from the variation in the external constraint that other political actors place on these policies.
New presidents who are empowered by a decisive election have more leverage and are therefore better able to pursue
otherwise constrained foreign policies such as the use of major force. In contrast, those who win by smaller margins have
less political capital and are forced disproportionately to the less constrained arenas of diplomacy and crisis intervention.
Victory in a U.S. presidential election only requires a
majority in the Electoral College, but it is widely acknowl-
edged that the margin of victory impacts what a president
is able to accomplish once in office. The expectation is
that a substantial mandate contributes to political power,
and power enables bold policymaking. A voluminous
body of academic work explores the effect of electoral
margins on domestic policy,2 but the implications for for-
eign policy have not been systematically addressed in the
literature. This article seeks to fill that gap by asking:
Does the margin of victory in presidential elections alter
the content of American foreign policy?
The short answer is that it does. In the empirical analy-
sis that follows, I will demonstrate that substantial mar-
gins of victory translate into political power that increases
a president’s ability to overcome constraints from other
institutional actors (notably Congress) on the use of mili-
tary force. Of course, there is much more to U.S. foreign
policy than force alone. To gain a more complete picture
of foreign policy activity, I expand the analysis to assess
diplomacy and crisis engagement. In these cases, how-
ever, the relationship with electoral margins works differ-
ently. While military force is more constrained (Howell
and Pevehouse 2005) and therefore requires political cap-
ital to implement, weaker presidents can still initiate
diplomacy and engage (non-militarily) in foreign political
crises because these actions are subject to less constraint.
As a result, those who win elections by less embrace these
foreign policies disproportionately.
The theoretical framework that I present here, which
focuses on the interplay between political strength and
constraint, stands in contrast to that which underpins most
research tying elections to foreign policy. The ‘‘rally’’ and
diversionary war literatures, for example, speak to the ways
in which elections might shape foreign policy by altering
incentives (Morgan and Bickers 1992; James and Rioux
1998; Baum 2002). In this view, the shadow of an upcom-
ing election leads presidents to tailor their foreign policy
decisions accordingly. Here, the theoretical mechanism is
quite different: elections and their outcomes alter presi-
dential power and, with it, the ability to attain otherwise
constrained policy preferences. Put differently, while the
existing literature sees anticipation of the next election as
an important determinant of foreign policy, this analysis
demonstrates that the previous election matters as well.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. I begin
by developing the theoretical relationship between the
margin of electoral victory and presidential foreign policy
behavior. With the theoretical relationship identified, I
turn to empirical tests of the derived hypotheses using data
on elections and foreign policy activity from 1945 to 2001.
I explore the relationships at multiple levels of analysis,
controlling for factors such as the partisan composition of
Congress, presidential approval, and the condition of the
economy. These findings contribute to a growing litera-
ture indicating that politics does not stop at the water’s
edge, but rather that domestic political intuitions deeply
impact foreign affairs. I conclude with a discussion of the
implications of these findings for how we think about elec-
tions, presidential agendas, and foreign policy.
Theory
I link electoral margins to foreign policy outcomes in
three steps. First, I draw on the extant literature to estab-
lish that electoral margins contribute to presidential
strength early in administrations. Second, I identify a
spectrum of foreign policies that vary in the degree to
which they are subject to external constraint, and there-
fore require different amounts of political strength to
implement. These are diplomacy (low constraint), crisis
engagement (medium constraint), and substantial mili-
tary force (high constraint). Third, I formalize the rela-
tionship between political strength and policy choice,
establishing that an increase in power leads to an
increase in more constrained activities and, counterintui-
tively, to a decrease in less constrained activities.
Electoral Margins Contribute to Political Power
Presidents claim mandates, and the press, public, and Con-
gress respond in kind because they share the belief that
1 I thank Bob Axelrod, Matt Baum, John Ciorciari, Chris Gelpi, Julia Gray,
Monica Hakimi, Andrew Kerner, Mel Levitsky, Jim Morrow, Steve Ratner, Al
Stam, and Mark Tessler for helpful comments. Will Howell and Jon Pevehouse
graciously provided their data. All errors are my own. Data and replication
code are available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~pbkp.
2 For key examples see, Hershey (1994), Conley (2001), Johnson and
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electoral margins translate into political power.3 As Conley
(2001) notes, the margin of electoral victory informs Con-
gress about the political strength of a president and the
popularity of his agenda. The result is that a significant
margin of victory in an election puts a president in a better
bargaining position vis-a`-vis Congress and therefore makes
his preferences more attainable, all else equal.4 Legislators
take careful note of this information because they recog-
nize that standing in the path of a president with popular
support can have consequences (Mann 1990:90).
I argue that electoral outcomes are among the most
powerful and transparent signals of popular support avail-
able in American politics, particularly early in administra-
tions. Public support, in turn, both increases the range of
alternatives available to a president (Neustadt 1960; Light
1982) and influences the president’s choice and timing of
alternatives (Ostrom and Simon 1985; Rohde and Simon
1985; Ostrom and Job 1986). Popular presidents can
move public opinion in favor of their preferences (And-
rade and Young 1996) and receive more deference from
Congress (Edwards 1980; Rohde and Simon 1985). As
Marra, Ostrom, and Simon (1990) note, popular support
provides presidents with political currency that is vital to
electoral survival and policy effectiveness. In short, presi-
dential popularity conveys credibility to other political
actors and has a self-reinforcing effect on the public.
Most studies of the relationship between popular sup-
port and presidential power conceive of support in terms
of approval ratings obtained through polling; however,
there are two related reasons why electoral margins are a
superior indicator of a president’s true standing early in
an administration.
First, presidential agendas, prospects, and policies are
disproportionately determined early in the term, making
the initial information about political strength conveyed
by an electoral outcome especially significant (Light
1982). The signal of popularity (and the corresponding
power) conveyed by an electoral margin declines over
time, but it plays an important role in setting the priors
of actors who could constrain a president’s agenda
(Grossback et al. 2006). Beginning the first day in office
after an election, public opinion polling and the course
of events are used to update these priors, but the initial
election provides the point of departure. Thus, while the
window of a hundred days that receives so much atten-
tion in the media is arbitrary in length, the idea that
presidential agendas and success are disproportionately
determined early in a term is very real.
Second, and more importantly, an electoral margin car-
ries information beyond what is provided by polling
because it represents the official count of mobilized vot-
ers rather than a snapshot of a more disengaged public’s
response to a pollster’s phone call. Polling, particularly
early in the term, occurs at a time when presidents are
governing rather than campaigning. This is a moment in
the cycle when presidents ‘‘cash in’’ the capital bestowed
by popularity to achieve political goals rather than maxi-
mizing popularity to win an election. Electoral outcomes
are therefore an important indication of the public’s
preferences and a president’s popularity and political skill
‘‘when it counts.’’ Thus, electoral margins convey infor-
mation about a president’s strength on the campaign
trail and the reach of his political apparatus–factors that
public opinion polls leave out, but that a legislator may
well take into account regardless of whether they would
like to ride the president’s coattails in the next election,
have a president campaign on their behalf, or avoid
overly enthusiastic presidential efforts in support of a
rival.
Political Power and Foreign Policy
Upon initial inspection, it might seem that the power
derived from electoral margins would have little impact
on foreign policy. This is simply because it is commonly
assumed that presidents have near absolute foreign policy
power and therefore need no additional political strength
to pursue their preferred course of action (Wildavsky
1966; Peterson 1994; Canes-Wrone, Howell, and Lewis
2008). However, recent work adds a wrinkle to this ortho-
doxy by demonstrating that presidents do not have equal
autonomy in all areas of foreign policy (Baum 2004;
Brule 2006). For example, Howell and Pevehouse (2005,
2007) find that Congress constrains the use of substantial
military force but that presidents have more discretion
over less politically salient tactics such as minor uses of
force. The implication is that presidents are faced with
an array of foreign policy options that require different
amounts of political power to implement. This variation
leads to a relationship between the content of U.S. for-
eign policy and the margin of electoral victory, which I
have argued is an important source of strength early in
administrations. I establish a spectrum of policies ranging
from diplomacy, to crisis intervention short of force, to
substantial military force. Each of these policies holds
risks and rewards for presidents. I therefore do not argue
that presidents systematically prefer one policy option
over the others. Rather, presidents seek the autonomy to
choose among policy options, and power obtained from a
large electoral margin can provide this.
Diplomacy
Presidential diplomacy is relatively unconstrained for a
variety of reasons. First, Congress has few functional institu-
tional levers with which to influence the diplomatic agenda
aside from the Senate’s role in confirming State Depart-
ment officials and ratifying treaties. Moreover, presidents
have a variety of tools with which to circumvent the
Congressional role in the treaty process, most notably
the use of executive agreements. While Congress decisively
influences the content of diplomatic relationships in a few
key instances–Taiwan and Cuba, for example–this is the
exception rather than the rule. Congress exercises espe-
cially little influence on the president’s personal diplo-
matic agenda in the form of summits and state visits.
3 There is a long history of presidents claiming that electoral margins
bestow power. Eisenhower, for example, took the margin of his victory as a
referendum on his policy preferences, saying, ‘‘the Republican Platform of
1956… was overwhelmingly endorsed by the country’s voters–by a margin of
almost ten million votes’’ (Eisenhower 1958). Along similar lines, Coolidge
suggested that his substantial margin of victory (25% points in the popular
vote) indicated that voters supported at least the ‘‘broad general principles’’
of his campaign (Kelley 1983).
4 There is a substantial literature on electoral mandates. Kelley (1983), for
example, argues that ‘‘elections carry messages about problems, policies, and
programs–messages plain to all and specific enough to be directive.’’ Conway
(2001) posits that a mandate exists when the electoral outcome of an election
is due to a particular policy prescription. However, it is difficult to confidently
identify situations that pass this test. Indeed, in earlier work, Riker (1988)
argues that it is impossible to take an aggregated election outcome and parse
out the degree to which it should be attributed to a particular policy issue,
implying that Conway’s standard is impossible to meet. Others have gone so
far as to link this identification problem to the accumulation of extra-constitu-
tional presidential powers through unsubstantiated mandate claims (Dahl
1990; Ellis and Kirk 1995). It should be noted, however, that the work on the
implications of electoral margins, while voluminous, is generally under-theo-
rized and therefore provides a relatively weak footing for the arguments made
here.
506 Electoral Margins and American Foreign Policy
Presidential diplomatic autonomy arises in large part
from Congressional disinterest. Congress has little incen-
tive to expend effort to influence diplomatic relations
because Congressional constituencies are local rather
than national, leading members to focus disproportion-
ately on domestic politics and the relatively few aspects of
foreign policy that garner public attention or directly
impact their constituency. In the vast majority of cases,
diplomacy operates well beneath the public’s radar
(Ostrom and Simon 1985), and typical individuals do not
know much about or engage with foreign policy (Delli
Carpini and Keeter 1996; Holsti 2004). Indeed, the con-
sensus in the literature is that, absent the major use of
force (which I will turn to momentarily), public opinion
is fundamentally incidental to the day-to-day foreign
policy process (Mueller 1973; Holsti and Rosenau 1984;
Zaller 1994; Shapiro and Jacobs 2000). The result is that
non-conflict foreign policy rarely contributes to Congres-
sional reelection prospects and is therefore less subject to
fierce political rivalry. In reaction to these incentives,
members of Congress tend to invest less in foreign pol-
icy expertise in general and diplomacy in particular
(Gailmard and Patty n.d.).5
Diplomacy, however, remains attractive for politically
weak presidents (including those constrained by small
margins of electoral victory), who do have a national con-
stituency and can turn to diplomatic engagement as a
residual productive outlet for obtaining their foreign pol-
icy objectives. Simon and Ostrom (1989) note that, under
some circumstances, direct presidential diplomacy can
increase popular support. Although the political benefits
of diplomacy can be transitory, the president can there-
fore engage abroad to create windows of opportunity for
improving his political standing (Mackuen 1983). In sum,
diplomatic engagement is a low risk, but low reward for-
eign policy.
Crisis Intervention
The president of the United States is confronted with a
nearly constant stream of international crises and must
decide whether or not to engage. Many of these are
clearly outside the interests of the United States and are
therefore unlikely to draw U.S. engagement. Others are
so strategically important that involvement is essentially
unavoidable. However, in many cases, presidents have
some leeway over whether to engage or remain aloof. To
take a well-known example, McGeorge Bundy, National
Security Advisor for Kennedy and Johnson, famously
noted, ‘‘Pleikus are like streetcars.’’ By calling the Pleiku
crisis a streetcar, Bundy was simply saying that if one waits
a little while, another such crisis would come along. Later
in life, Bundy expressed regret about the cynicism that
this comment implies, but the moment of candor reveals
the degree to which presidents have discretion when it
comes to crisis engagement.
Presidential autonomy over crisis engagement stems in
part from the office’s substantial informational advanta-
ges when it comes to foreign policy, particularly in the
short term (Baum and Potter 2008). As it does for diplo-
macy, this in part derives from the relative disinterest of
other political actors and the public, but it also has an
institutional basis. The presidency has important constitu-
tional advantages in the foreign policy arena that are par-
ticularly felt in crisis situations, and they have been
bolstered over time by the acquiescence of the legislative
and judicial branches. The National Security Act of 1947,
for example, increased presidential influence over for-
eign policy by handing over the levers of bureaucratic
control. The courts have further supported presidential
preeminence in the foreign policy arena (Marra et al.
1990). The result is that Congress is typically playing
catch-up, particularly in the shortened timeframes that
accompany crisis situations.
Crises are, however, inherently unpredictable. They
can drag on, escalate out of control, or evolve to become
political liabilities for a president, and in such cases, Con-
gress tends to reassert itself. Thus, while crisis engage-
ment may provide a president with an attractive
opportunity to look statesmanlike in a situation that is
more likely than diplomacy to garner some publicity, it
also carries the risk of non-negligible costs. Crisis engage-
ment could therefore be considered a medium risk, med-
ium reward foreign policy.
Military Force
Howell and Pevehouse (2005) demonstrate that, contrary
to popular belief, Congress constrains the president’s
ability to resort to force. They find that when the presi-
dent’s party holds more seats in Congress, the use of
major force is more common precisely because partisan
control allows the president to avoid or overcome con-
straint. In contrast, they find no relationship with the
minor use of force (over which presidents maintain more
autonomy), which is in keeping with the distinction I
draw here between more and less constrained foreign
policy activities.6
Presidents need political power to deploy substantial
military force because it is more politically salient than
diplomacy or crisis intervention. Most scholars draw a
clear distinction between public opinion on foreign policy
in general, on the one hand, and public opinion in rela-
tion to conflict on the other. For example, Powlick and
Katz (1998) argue that public opinion is typically latent
and inactive, leaving presidents a free hand in most cir-
cumstances to conduct policy as they see fit. However,
they suggest that under limited circumstances, particularly
those surrounding the commitment of military forces, for-
eign policy issues may ‘‘activate’’ public attention. Thus,
while the public is typically not closely attuned to the
details of international politics, the commitment of signifi-
cant U.S. forces typically attracts attention. With public
attention comes increased political salience and interfer-
ence from political actors outside the executive branch.
Conflict has potential benefits for presidents. Scholars
have long noted that the public often responds positively
in the short term to military engagements abroad, and a
voluminous literature has investigated the validity and mag-
5 Gailmard and Patty’s forthcoming book also speaks to the deeper histor-
ical origins of the variation in presidential autonomy over diplomacy, crisis
intervention, and the use of force. In their view, presidential claims of auton-
omy are important in part because they can be self-reinforcing. Thus, because
the executive claim of diplomatic authority is older it is also more entrenched,
reinforced, and unquestioned in American politics. Presidents wasted no time
asserting diplomatic autonomy. While George Washington initially took the
first part of the constitutional requirement for the Senate’s ‘‘advice and con-
sent’’ on treaties at face value and sought input on ongoing treaty negotia-
tions and diplomatic missions, he quickly grew disenchanted with legislative
involvement. Consultation gave way to updates, and by the beginning of the
nineteenth century presidents routinely presented completed treaties to the
Senate for ratification but sought no input on their negotiation. Lower level
diplomacy was the prerogative of the executive from the very start. In contrast,
presidents began to assert themselves forcefully in matters of armed conflict
in the twentieth century (Fisher 2004).
6 In later work, Howell and Pevehouse (2007) do find a relationship with
minor force, a point that I will return to in the empirical analysis.
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nitude of the ‘‘rally’’ phenomenon. Lee (1977:253) noted,
‘‘the average man’s reaction [to engagement abroad] will
include a feeling of patriotism in supporting presidential
actions.’’ Most empirical updates and tests confirm the
existence of a short-term rally effect to a greater or lesser
extent, and under at least some circumstances (James and
Oneal 1991; Oneal and Bryan 1995). However, even if pres-
idents are not banking on a durable rally in their approval
ratings, military engagements provide presidents with an
opportunity to change the political discourse and invoke
their role as commander in chief.
The use of force, however, carries potential costs as
well. Sizable military engagements typically last longer and
attract more scrutiny than less forceful foreign policies.
The result is a partial erosion of the president’s informa-
tional advantage vis-a`-vis both Congress and the public
(Baum and Potter 2008). Moreover, lengthy engagements
rapidly become costly ones. Even if Congress is poorly
positioned to cut off funding to troops in the field, the
power of the purse contributes to still more scrutiny. Sev-
eral scholars have argued that casualties that may accom-
pany the major use of force have the potential to turn
public opinion against the use of force and the president
who initiated it (Mueller 1973; Gartner and Segura 1998;
Slantchev 2004). Kriner’s (2010) finding that Congress is
less likely to contest the president’s conduct of major mili-
tary actions when presidential approval is high suggests
that these risks are potentially higher for presidents with
low approval ratings to begin with. Finally, the returns on
the use of force are unpredictable, particularly because
rallies in opinion are not necessarily consistent or durable
(Lian and Oneal 1993). Taken together, this suggests that
while significant potential benefits accompany the use of
substantial force, there are substantial risks as well.
Linking Political Strength and Policy Choice
I have established that election margins can contribute to
political strength and that various foreign policies require
different quantities of political strength to implement.
The remaining task is to clarify how variations along
these two dimensions interact. I argue that an increase in
political strength will lead to an increase in otherwise
constrained policies, but that such an increase will also
be associated with a decline in the incidence of less con-
strained policies.
Trade-offs in foreign policy occur in two ways. Presi-
dents choose which problems to address (for example, a
choice between addressing a diplomatic problem in Latin
America or a military problem in Asia). They also substi-
tute alternative policies as solutions to a single problem
(i.e. to address a situation in North Africa with force or
diplomacy). This conception of the trade-offs that presi-
dents face builds on the well-established literature on for-
eign policy substitutability (Most and Starr 1989), which,
among other things, holds that leaders have a variety of
foreign policy options that may achieve their goals (Ben-
nett and Nordstrom 2000).
This balancing act between policy options becomes
clearer when it is modeled in a decision theoretic frame-
work as a simple budget optimization problem with two
constraints, political strength and time (Figure 1). For
simplicity, I consider the trade-off between two foreign
policies: a more constrained activity like the use of force
(X1), and a less constrained activity like diplomacy (X2).
Presidents have some finite amount of political strength
or capital (Y), which they can spend to overcome
constraint. By definition, X2 requires less Y to obtain than
X1, meaning that it has a lower ‘‘price’’ (p), that is,
p1 > p2, resulting in a budget line with a slope of p2 ⁄ p1.
As I have discussed, each policy comes with potential
risks and rewards. It is therefore unclear a priori, which
would be preferred by presidents. One thing that is clear,
however, is that a president would likely be ill served by a
foreign policy that consisted exclusively of diplomacy or
force because the optimal approach is highly context
dependent. In some situations diplomacy may be highly
rewarding. In others, crisis intervention or the use of
force may achieve the desired effect. Presidents seek the
autonomy to pick the right tool for the job, and a strong
president has more options than a weak one. I therefore
assume no preference order between the foreign policies,
but instead argue that presidents seek balance and flexi-
bility, which I model with a standard convex indifference
curve between bundles of X1 and X2.
The final constraint on presidential choice is time.
Presidents and administrations have finite resources and
must prioritize activities. To capture this constraint on
capacity, I assume that total activity is bound at T, mean-
ing simply that there a limited amount of total foreign
policy activity that can be accomplished and it must be
divided in some way between X1 and X2. The constraint is
therefore a diagonal from T ⁄ tX2 (where tX2 is the time
required per unit of less constrained activity) to T ⁄ tX1
(where tX1 is the time required per unit of the con-
strained activity). For simplicity, I treat tX1 as equal to tX2
in Figure 1. However, the implications of the theory hold
if tX1 > tX2 or tX1 < tX2.
Taken together, the indifference curve, budget con-
straint, and limit on total activity constitute a optimiza-
tion problem for a hypothetical president. The central
implications are apparent in Figure 1 and give rise to test-
able hypotheses. An increase in political power leads to an
increase in the incidence of more constrained policies, but
also a decline in less constrained policies. As presidents
gain political capital (i.e. they shift from Y to Y + e) they
can ‘‘afford’’ more constrained policies, shifting the bud-
get line from Y ⁄ p1 to (Y + e) ⁄ p2. In conjunction with con-
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FIG 1. Power, Constraint, and Policy
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shifts the intersection of the constraints and the indiffer-
ence curve from A to B.
All this, of course, assumes that presidents will not
respond to weakness by simply doing less. This expectation
is, however, in keeping with Ostrom and Job’s (1986) asser-
tion that each president has a limited time in which to
make a case for reelection or put a mark on history and
therefore has a strong incentive for action. Moreover, as I
have already implied, less constrained policies like diplo-
macy and crisis intervention, though less politically con-
tested, still have value. Thus, if presidential activity is
constrained, the total volume of activity remains the same
but the focus of the activity shifts away from the constraint.
Hypotheses
In sum, electoral margins are a source of political
strength while diplomacy, crisis intervention, and the use
of substantial force require varying amounts of political
strength to implement. I anticipate that an increase in
political power in terms of an increased margin of victory
will result in a corresponding rise in otherwise more pol-
icy and a decline in less constrained policy. Taken
together these insights give rise to four hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: There is a strong negative relationship between
the margin by which a president wins an election and diplo-
macy.
Hypothesis 2: There is a weak negative relationship between
the margin by which a president wins an election and engage-
ment in international crises.
Hypothesis 3: There is a strong positive relationship between
the margin by which a president wins an election and the major
use of force.
Hypothesis 4: There is a strong positive relationship between
the margin by which a president wins an election and the proba-
bility of a major use of force given the opportunity for a major
use of force.
Hypotheses 1–3 are straightforward and posit the sign
and magnitude of the relationships between electoral
margins and the three foreign policies that I have
described in detail. The fourth claim takes a slightly dif-
ferent form. While the signs and magnitudes of the
counts of diplomatic activity, crisis engagement and
the use of force are testable implications of the theory;
the theory itself is about trade-offs. It therefore makes
sense to expand the inquiry to explicitly consider the
choices that presidents make. By assessing the actual use
of force in the context of opportunities it is possible, in a
limited way, to investigate the choices that presidents
make about foreign policy.7 In addition, because oppor-
tunities for force arise in situations that are clearly of
high political salience for the United States, it is reason-
able to anticipate that the United States often engages
diplomatically when force is not used.
Research Design and Findings
I test these hypotheses in a series of statistical models
loosely based on those of Howell and Pevehouse (2005,
2007), but with departures owing to the need for differ-
ent controls, the emphasis on electoral margins as the
key explanatory variable, and the relative shortage of
degrees of freedom. I begin by describing the variables in
detail. Summary statistics and additional tests can be
found in Appendix 1 to this article.
Dependent Variables
I measure diplomatic activity in terms of direct interac-
tion between heads of state.8 This can take the form of
presidential trips abroad or official visits from foreign
leaders to the United States. In the models that follow, I
consider both the combined and disaggregated measures
of presidential trips abroad and official visits.
While official visits certainly do not capture all diplo-
matic activity, they serve as a useful proxy for the underly-
ing object of interest. Presidential time is valuable, and
presidential activities are carefully choreographed. Meet-
ings between heads of state occupy substantial resources,
particularly in terms of time, and it is therefore reason-
able to assume that they signal an administration’s com-
mitment to high-level diplomacy. In addition, direct
presidential diplomacy is precisely the sort of activity that
is most likely to be ‘‘crowded out’’ by other activities that
require more political capital. Finally, direct presidential
diplomacy is substantively important in its own right, as
some issues in international relationships can only be
sorted out at the highest levels. Official visits act as dead-
lines that move international relationships to the front
burner. Moreover, while the actual signing of agreements
is often staged for public consumption, the agreements
themselves represent thousands of hours of work and
negotiation by administration officials.
Relying on direct presidential diplomacy as a measure
of diplomatic engagement does have some limitations.
There are a certain number of ‘‘obligatory’’ state visits
between close allies. Presidents since Reagan have actually
made a point of getting their trips to Canada and Mexico
out of the way before the inauguration, but a trip to the
United Kingdom invariably happens within the first
few months in office regardless of the political strength of
the newly elected president. To address this, I count the
total time of visits in days rather than the number of visits
because even though presidents must visit and host a
certain number of key allies and strategically important
states they still hold sway over the length of these visits.9
I draw on data from the International Crisis Behavior
(ICB) project to measure U.S. involvement in international
crises. The ICB project identifies two defining conditions
7 Ideally, the empirical analysis would also consider total opportunities for
crisis intervention and diplomacy. However, there are several reasons why this
is not possible. First, the opportunity for diplomacy is essentially constant
since a president could theoretically be abroad or hosting a foreign head of
state any day of the quarter. As far as opportunities for crisis intervention are
concerned, the difficulty is that the ICB data set was not built to account for
crisis ‘‘opportunities.’’ Many situations that are not in the data set would have
become crises by the ICB definition if the United States had become involved.
Others that are in the data set were so removed from US interests that it
would be a stretch to say that there was an opportunity for US engagement.
Still others transpired in such a way that the crisis was only perceived by the
crisis actors, that is, secrecy or obscurity meant that US decision makers were
likely unaware that the crisis even occurred until after the fact. For more on
this see Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000).
8 Data on presidential travel was derived from information available on
the State Department website http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/trvl/pres/
index.htm.
9 Data on official visits is available from the State Department: http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/c1792.htm. I treat days on which there was more than
one foreign head of state in the United States as single positive observations.
This primarily occurred when there were multiple heads of state present for a
summit or signing event, but was rare.
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for a crisis: (i) a change in type and ⁄or an increase in inten-
sity of disruptive, that is, hostile verbal or physical, interac-
tions between two or more states, with a heightened
probability of military hostilities; that, in turn, (ii) destabi-
lizes their relationship and challenges the structure of
an international system–global, dominant, or subsystem
(Brecher and Ben-Yehuda 1985).10
I assess only crises in which the U.S. was a third party–
rather than all crises, or crises in which the U.S. was an
actor–in order to isolate situations in which presidents
have chosen to engage as opposed to those in which the
United States was forced to act by strategic interest. I also
excluded instances of U.S. involvement in the form of
direct military activity, as this would overlap with major
uses of force.
Data on the use of force are adapted from and Howell
and Pevehouse’s (2005) quarterly data set. They in turn
draw from Fordham (1998), Fordham and Sarver (2001)
and Zelikow (1987), all of which build on Blechman and
Kaplan’s (1978) original use of force data set. The data set
ranks U.S. applications of force on a five-point scale rang-
ing from low to high. Howell and Pevehouse demonstrate
that Congress only constrains the use of ‘‘major force’’ as
described by Blechman and Kaplan (1978).11 I follow their
lead by only counting events that reach this threshold.12
Data on opportunities for the use of force come from
Howell and Pevehouse (2007).13 They mined the front
page of the New York Times for mentions of ‘‘violent acts
perpetrated against the United States government, threats
to the stability of foreign regimes, gross violations of
international law, and nuclear proliferation.’’14
Independent Variables
In the regressions that follow I rely on the popular vote
margin to characterize the magnitude of the president’s
victory (Pop. Lead).15 I analyze the margin in terms of the
lead in percentage points over the closest runner up in
order to minimize the impact of third party candidates.
To account for the possibility that the effect of the elec-
toral margin could fade over time, I multiply the electoral
margin by the time to the next election. This causes the
value to decline linearly (Baum and Groeling 2009).16
To account for variation in the amount of constraint
imposed by Congress, I include the average percentage
of seats held by the president’s party in both houses (Con-
gress).17 I also evaluate the combined number of seats that
the incoming (or reelected) president’s party gains or
losses in the House and Senate (Seat Swing). This ‘‘coat-
tail effect’’ could be another source of early political
strength deriving from an election, as was apparently the
case in the 2008 election when the surge of Democratic
Congressional successes was seen as a signal of strong
popular support for Obama and his agenda. These mea-
sures capture aspects of two competing theories of Con-
gress. The Seat Swing variable reflects Grossback et al.’s
conception of the message members of Congress receive
from elections (Peterson et al. 2003; Grossback et al.
2005; Grossback, Peterson, and Stimson 2006), while the
Congress variable adheres more closely to standard con-
ceptions of institutional balancing in which the relative
strength and distribution of parties within the branches
drives outcomes (Krehbiel 1996).
I control for the independent effect of presidential
approval ratings with data from Gallup (Approval), assess-
ing the first poll in each quarter.18 This allows me to dis-
tinguish between the independent effect of electoral
margin and the more commonly discussed effects of day-
to-day popularity.
I include the president’s term (1st or 2nd) to address
the possibility that second term presidents could be sys-
tematically more or less likely to go abroad, engage in
international crises, or use force (Term). For example, it
may be that presidents engage in more diplomacy in the
second term because they are freed by term limits from
the need to win reelection.
I also control for the president’s political party (Party)
to account for the possibility that there are partisan dif-
ferences in the inclination toward various foreign policy
options. For example, some might argue that Democratic
presidents systematically prefer diplomacy while Republi-
cans are inclined toward force. I code Democratic presi-
dents 0 and Republican presidents 1.19
Many scholars have noted that foreign policy, and par-
ticularly the use of force, may respond to underlying eco-
nomic conditions. In general, the literature links weak
economies to relatively aggressive foreign policy (Clark
2000; Fordham 2002). DeRouen and Peake (2002), for
example, suggest that military engagements can divert
public attention from an economic downturn. It is rea-
10 The system level data set that results from this definition currently con-
tains 452 incidents from the end of WWI through 2006. For more on the
International Crisis Behavior project, see Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1989,
2000).
11 A major use of force requires the use of at least one ‘‘major force com-
ponent,’’ which is defined as two or more aircraft carrier task groups, over a
battalion of ground forces, or one or more combat air wings.
12 I replicated all models using minor uses of force as the dependent vari-
able and, as anticipated, found negative but statistically insignificant results
for the electoral margins variable. This result likely reflects the heightened
autonomy of presidents in this area.
13 I rely on Pevehouse and Howell’s opportunities data rather than Meer-
nik’s (2004), because they cover the entire period of analysis under investiga-
tion here and have a more expansive definition of opportunity.
14 This measure does have limitations. For example, Brule, Marshall, and
Prins (2010) point out that it is unreasonable to think that such opportunities
always arise exogenously from the international environment independent of
the president’s vulnerability or strength.
15 The most obvious alternative is the Electoral College margin. Arguably
a president able to win a broad range of states is more powerful than one with
an equivalent margin in the popular vote whose support was more concen-
trated. In response to these concerns, I checked all the models presented in
the analysis that follows using the Electoral College margin and found results
of the anticipated signs, but of inconsistent statistical significance. There are
two likely explanations for this outcome. First, the Electoral College measure
does not map as clearly to the theory that I have outlined, which is predicated
on signals of popular support. Second, the Electoral College has a well-known
tendency to exaggerate the degree by which the winning candidate prevails
and is therefore a muddier signal of popularity to those who would constrain
the president’s agenda.
16 Results without this erosion parameter and with nonlinear erosion can
be found in Table A3 and are similar to those presented here.
17 In unreported robustness tests, I assessed alternative conceptions of
Congressional constraint, specifically whether the government is unified and
‘‘legislative potential for policy change’’ (LPPC), which is a measure adapted
from Brady, Cooper, and Hurley (1979). LPPC indexes the size of the majority
and its cohesiveness, as well as the size of the minority and its cohesiveness.
The findings are consistent with those presented in Table 1.
18 Some readers may be concerned about collinearity between the elec-
tion margins and approval ratings. The correlation is positive, but relatively
low (0.105).
19 It is also possible that presidents might have varying baseline levels of
military aggressiveness. For example, Reagan’s rhetoric about restoring Ameri-
can military prowess might suggest such a tendency. Alternatively, presidents
such as Eisenhower might be less constrained due to their military back-
ground. While I only include Party in the primary models, I tested other presi-
dent-level covariates such as age, military experience and vice presidential
experience in unreported robustness checks, finding no systematic effect.
Presidential fixed effects models, the results of which can be found in Appen-
dix 1, resolve all such potential issues. The results from those models confirm
the findings reported here.
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sonable to anticipate that economic conditions may also
have a relationship with electoral margins, given Ameri-
cans well-known tendency to vote with their pocketbooks.
In response, I control for the condition of the economy
using quarterly data on unemployment from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (Unemployment).20 Some work relating
the condition of the economy to the use of force also
includes the Consumer Price Index in equivalent regres-
sions, so I include it here as well (CPI).
The regressions on diplomacy need to account for
changes in the relative ease and speed of air travel over
the period of analysis, which would presumably have an
independent effect on presidential diplomacy. Regular
presidential air travel on dedicated craft began with
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1943 trip to the Casablanca Con-
ference, but very early air transit was uncomfortable, inse-
cure, relatively slow, and therefore infrequent. From
Kennedy onward, however, there has been a surprising
degree of consistency in the quality of presidential air
transport. The major cut point occurs in 1958 with the
introduction of jet engines after which speed, range, and
comfort remained remarkably constant. Indeed, there
have been relatively few presidential planes–just four Boe-
ing jets in the last 50 years, all with maximum speeds of
approximately 600 miles per hour and ranges of about
7,500 miles. These trends hold for foreign heads of state
as well. Therefore, I simply control for the introduction
of jet engines on Air Force One in 1958 (Jet).
Finally, in the regressions on crisis engagement and
the major use of force, I include a dichotomous variable
for the Cold War period (1945–1989) (Cold War). The
concern here is that the heightened strategic tension in
that period may have made the commitment of U.S.
forces a substantively different proposition than it was
after the Soviet Union fell and United States emerged as
the sole superpower in the system.
Period and Structure of the Analysis
The models cover the period from 1945 to 2001. I assess
just the first year of each term in order to remain consis-
tent and comparable with other work on the effects of
presidential electoral margins (e.g. Grossback et al. 2005,
2006) and to further minimize concern over the poten-
tially declining effect of electoral margins over time. Lim-
iting the analysis to the first year of each term also avoids
complications introduced by midterm elections as well as
presidents who did not serve a full term.
I exclude periods in which the president was not
elected, but rather took office upon the death or depar-
ture of a predecessor (Truman’s first term, Johnson’s first
term, and the Ford Administration), since there is no the-
oretically meaningful electoral margin to assess. Truman
and Johnson are included in the analysis once elected in
their own right.
Model and Findings
I test the hypotheses by fitting eight maximum likelihood
models (two for each dependent variable), which are pre-
sented in Table 1. Since diagnostics revealed no evidence
of substantial temporal dynamics, I follow Howell and
Pevehouse’s (2005) lead by employing relatively simple
negative binomial models for the dependant variables
that are counts (Models 1–6). These models have a quar-
terly unit of analysis. Models 7 and 8 are logistic regres-
sions on the dichotomous use of force, with the
‘‘opportunity’’ for force as the unit of analysis.
I do not include presidential fixed effects in the pri-
mary models in Table 1. Presidents are elected twice at
most and many served only a single term. There are
therefore a maximum of eight observations per president
and a corresponding shortage of degrees of freedom.
More significantly, there are at most two election margins
per administration. In such a circumstance within admin-
istration analysis asks too much of the data. As a result,
the comparison is necessarily between (rather than
within) administrations. I do, however, explore potential
outliers and presidential fixed effects models in Appen-
dix 1 to this paper and find substantively similar results
to those that I present here.
Models 1, 3, 5, and 7 fit just the bivariate relationship
between the margin of electoral victory and the depen-
dent variables. Models 2, 4, 6, and 8 fit the models with
the control variables. The bivariate tests provide assur-
ance that the observed relationship is more than an arti-
fact of the control variables (Achen 2002, 2005).
Models 1 and 2 indicate a strong, statistically significant
negative relationship between margin of electoral victory
and total diplomacy (the combined measure of presiden-
tial trips abroad and visits to the U.S. by foreign heads of
state). That is, as predicted by Hypothesis 1, as the
margin of electoral victory increases, direct presidential
diplomacy decreases. The magnitude of the effect is sub-
stantial–holding the remaining independent variables
constant, a hypothetical newly elected (or reelected) pres-
ident who ties a rival in the popular vote is predicted to
spend 16 days on diplomacy. When the electoral margin
increases by 10-percentage points this declines to just 6
days–a reduction of nearly two thirds.
In line with expectations, the findings for crisis inter-
vention are weaker. While the sign is in the correct direc-
tion, the bivariate relationship in Model 3 does not reach
the threshold for statistical significance. The coefficient
in Model 4, however, is negative and statistically signifi-
cant, indicating partial support for Hypothesis 2. A 10%
increase in the margin of electoral victory (from 0)
results in a 20% decrease in U.S. crisis engagement.
As presaged by Hypothesis 3, the sign flips when it
comes to the use of force. Models 5 and 6 assess the rela-
tionship between electoral margin and the major use of
military force, and here the coefficients for electoral mar-
gin are positive and significant. All other covariates held
constant, a 10-percentage point increase (from 0) nearly
triples the expected instances of the major application of
military force by the United States.
The relative magnitudes of these effects also match those
predicted by the first three hypotheses. Figure 2 compares
the relative effect of electoral margin on diplomacy, crisis
intervention, and the use of force (Models 2, 4, and 6) by
identifying the change in the predicted percentage of the
mean quarterly value as electoral margin in increases from
0 to 20, which is the approximate range in electoral margin
observed in the data. There are substantial changes in both
diplomacy and the use of force over that span, and a more
moderate change in crisis intervention.
The strong substantive effect on diplomacy is particu-
larly notable. It seems that while the literature has almost
exclusively focused on conflict and crisis, variation in
presidential power and autonomy also has important
effects on the U.S. diplomatic posture.
20 I tested change in GDP per capita as an alternative measure of eco-
nomic misery and obtained equivalent results.
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A similar thing can be said for the findings on the oppor-
tunity to use force. Models 7 and 8 in Table 1 support
Hypothesis 4, indicating that when confronted with an
opportunity to use force presidents with substantial mar-
gins of victory are more likely to act on it. Indeed, the pre-
dicted probabilities in Figure 3 indicate that over the
observed span of electoral victory the probability that a
president will employ force given the opportunity increases
from near 0 in the case of a tie in popular vote to nearly
one out of three with an electoral margin of victory of 20%.
The two Congress variables tell a mixed story across the
models. Seat Swing is negative and statistically significant in
models of diplomacy and crisis intervention. As the presi-
dent’s party increases its Congressional presence, the Uni-
ted States is more likely to become involved in
international crises. The robustness checks that follow,
however, do not consistently find such an effect for Con-
gressional margins, so it is possible that this finding is an
artifact of this particular model. In contrast, the Congress
variable is positive and significant in the models of crisis
and opportunity for force. The mixed findings for crisis are
unsurprising since, as I have already pointed out, this is the
middle option. Moreover, the negative findings for diplo-
macy and the positive findings for opportunity are in keep-
ing with the theory. However, the lack of consistent
statistical significance lessens confidence in these findings
and limits the degree to which we can arbitrate between the
aforementioned theories of Congress. Indeed, it is telling
that, at least in the first year, the effects of Congressional
strength are tempered by the inclusion of electoral margins
in the model vis-a`-vis what has been found elsewhere in the
literature (i.e. Howell and Pevehouse 2005, 2007).
Approval rating is generally insignificant across the mod-
els with the exception of the large, statistically significant
coefficient for the use of force. Existing findings on the
relationship between approval polls and the use of force
is mixed, and this secondary finding from this analysis
only adds to that. While Kriner (2010) finds evidence of
a modest relationship between approval and the duration
of major military actions, most work in this area finds no
relationship between approval and force (e.g. Meernik
2004; Howell and Pevehouse 2005, 2007). The difference
likely owes to the fact that the models that I present here
are limited to the first year after the election.
Findings for the role of Term are equally mixed. The
coefficients are positive and significant for crisis interven-
tion and force ⁄opportunity, but insignificant elsewhere.
There is a relatively consistent effect for the party vari-
able across the models. It is positive in all cases and statis-
tically significant in the regressions on crisis involvement
and the use of force. While this result stands in partial
opposition to Gowa’s (1998) finding that partisanship
stops at the water’s edge, it does not suggest that Republi-
cans are systematically more aggressive. Instead, the take
away appears to be that there is some evidence to suggest
that Democratic presidents are less active in foreign pol-
icy across the board. However, it is worth noting that this
finding does not prove especially durable in the robust-
ness checks that follow.
Unemployment has the anticipated positive relationship
with force and force ⁄opportunity. The use of force litera-
ture has established that presidents tend to turn to the
external use of military power to distract from economic
woes at home. The negative relationship with crisis inter-
vention is less expected, but is consistent across the robust-
ness checks. Further complicating matters, CPI has a
positive and significant relationship with crisis, but a nega-
tive and significant relationship with force ⁄opportunity.
TABLE 1. Trips Abroad, Crisis Engagement, Uses of Major Force, and Opportunities for Force: 1945–2001
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N 58 58 58 58 58 58 3,716 3,716
(Notes: +< .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
Estimates for Models 1–6 are maximum likelihood coefficients obtained from negative binomial models with a quarterly unit of analysis. Estimates for Models 7
and 8 are maximum likelihood coefficients obtained from logistic models with the opportunity for the use of force as the unit of analysis. Standard errors (clus-
tered by president) in are parentheses. Constants are suppressed to conserve space.)
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Robustness
For the primary robustness check, I explore alternative
specifications of the dependent variables (Table 2). First I
disaggregate the diplomacy measure into presidential trips
abroad and official visits to Washington by foreign heads
of state. Next, I explore covert operations to further iso-
late interventions over which presidents have the greatest
discretion, since these interventions are particularly insu-
lated from Congressional control and public scrutiny. In
lieu of major uses of force, I turn to fatal militarized inter-
state disputes (MID) initiated by the United States from
the Correlates of War (COW) project.21 The COW project
defines a MID as: ‘‘[A] set of interactions between or
among states involving threats to use military force, dis-
plays of military force, or actual uses of military force…
these acts must be explicit, overt, non-accidental, and
government sanctioned’’ (Gochman and Maoz 1984).22
Models 1 and 2 indicate a significant negative relation-
ship between electoral margin and trips abroad by the
U.S. president as well as official visits from foreign heads
of state. However, when disaggregated, it becomes clear
that the effect on official visits by foreign heads of state is
substantially smaller than that observed for presidential
trips abroad. This finding seems reasonable since presi-
dents presumably have more discretion over their own
actions than those of other heads of state.
Model 3 finds the expected negative relationship
between electoral margin and covert operations. While
often violent, these interventions are secret and can
remain so long after the fact. They therefore require
almost no political strength to implement. This finding
helps to further clarify the distinction that separates the
previously identified positive findings for the public use
of substantial force from the negative relationship
between crisis engagement and election margins.
In contrast, there is no clear relationship between
electoral margin and the number of fatal MIDs initiated
by the United States. The sign is positive, but the stan-
dard error is large enough to render this largely mean-
ingless. Interpreting a null finding is difficult, but it is
plausible that it stems from the definition of the MID
measure, which combines events that the president has
FIG 2. Quarterly Expected Value ⁄Mean as Electoral Margin Ranges from 0 to 20
(Notes: Estimates are significant at the .05 level or greater. Confidence intervals are excluded to aid visualization.)
FIG 3. Probability of Force Given Opportunity as Electoral Margin Ranges from 0 to 20
(Notes: The area between the dashed lines is the .95 confidence interval.)
21 Similar findings are obtained from regressions on U.S. initiated MIDS
with more major uses of force, as identified with either the fatality level vari-
able or the level of hostility variable.
22 For more on MIDs and the COW project see, Singer (1972, 1979, 1980)
and Leng and Singer (1988). The current MIDs 3.10 data set contains 2,331
militarized disputes from 1816 to 2001 coded for duration, outcome, and level
of fatality (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004).
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substantial control over with those that are more sub-
ject to constraint (substantial military engagements
including those with casualties short of 1,000 battle
deaths). In this sense, the measure falls somewhere
between crisis involvement and the major use of force
in the degree to which it is predicated on presidential
power. Indeed, this finding is not altogether surprising
since, as Fordham and Sarver (2001) note, ‘‘in spite of
its usefulness for other conflict research, the MID data
are not appropriate for analyses of U.S. decisions to
use force.’’
A variety of additional robustness checks can be found
in Appendix 1 to this paper. There I assess potential
outliers and present results from time-series models with
presidential fixed effects and seemingly unrelated regres-
sion (SUR) analyses (Zellner 1962; Greene 1990). The
findings I have presented hold in these alternative specifi-
cations, indicating a robust and consistent relationship
between electoral margins and foreign policy in the direc-
tions that I have hypothesized.
Conclusion
All else equal, presidents who win elections by a substan-
tial margin engage in less personal diplomacy and fewer
international crises, but turn to military force more reg-
ularly. I have argued that this distinction stems from the
increase in political power lent by substantial margins of
victory. Powerful presidents have more options and lever-
age, and are therefore better able to pursue constrained
foreign policies such as the use of major force, but do
so at the expense of personal involvement in diplomacy.
In contrast, constrained policies are less available to
those who win by less, are they are forced disproportion-
ately toward diplomacy and crisis intervention. These
findings contribute to the emerging body of research
(i.e. Canes-Wrone et al. 2008) that seeks to reestablish
the importance of the broader institutional framework
when seeking to understand how presidents make for-
eign policy.
In the process of establishing this argument, I hope
to have made two secondary contributions. First, the the-
ory and analysis recast the relationship between elections
and presidential foreign policy in more general terms of
variation in power and constraint and away from analysis
of the incentives introduced by future elections. Second,
I have expanded the analysis of foreign policy beyond
the usual myopic focus on conflict. My hope is that
these adjustments pave the way for productive future
work.
These findings also have implications for policy. The
positive relationship between electoral margins and the
use of major force demonstrates another path through
which U.S. electoral intuitions can systematically alter
international politics. Given the unique position of the
United States in the world, if there are systemic elements
shaping the United States’ military behavior then there
are necessarily global implications. The insight that rela-
tive commitment to diplomacy depends in part on the
availability of other options, however, is of equal impor-
tance. As Clinton’s late, and ultimately unsuccessful, foray
into the Middle East peace process demonstrates, it can
be important to commit to diplomatic engagement and
leadership early in a presidency. However, the analysis
presented here suggests that there are systematic forces
pushing the ‘‘strongest’’ American presidents away from
personal engagement in diplomacy, especially at the
beginning of their administration when they would likely
be most effective. The result is uneven diplomatic
engagement that may undermine effectiveness.
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Appendix 1
This appendix provides additional statistical results to
establish the robustness of the core findings from
Table 1. All data are available on the author’s website.
Table A1 presents summary statistics for the variables
used in body of the paper as well as the robustness
checks that follow.
Table A1. Summary Statistics
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Dependent variables
Diplomacy 11.65 8.49 1 32
Crisis 1.20 1.17 0 4
Major force 0.59 0.79 0 2
Opportunity 0.068 0.252 0 1
Abroad 3.40 4.38 0 17
Visit 8.25 6.33 1 25
MID 0.88 0.87 0 3
Covert 0.25 0.49 0 2
Key independent variables
Pop. lead 9.21 7.22 )1 23
Approval 60.84 8.60 36.48 83.35
Seat swing 0.52 0.08 0.43 0.68
Congress 0.507 0.080 0.349 0.679
LPPC 3.58 13.07 )14.32 26.96
Unified 0.45 0.50 0 1
Party 0.536 0.494 0 1
Unemploy. 5.22 1.72 1.10 7.50
CPI 3.61 2.75 )2.70 11.20
Outliers
A primary concern is that outliers might drive the rela-
tionship between electoral margins on foreign policy
behavior. To alleviate this concern, I present simple
scatter plots (Figures A1–A3) of the margin of elec-
toral victory and the three central dependent variables–
diplomacy, crisis engagement, and the use of major
force.
Fig A1. Diplomacy and the Popular Vote Margin
There is some structure in the data in Figure A1, but it
adheres closely to issues that I have raised and controlled
for. For example, it is apparent that early presidents trav-
elled less than later ones–this is precisely the issue that
the control for the advent of jet travel addresses. There
could also be some concern that G.W. Bush or Johnson
has an undue influence on the finding. However, the key
insights from Table 1 hold when these presidents are
excluded from the analysis.
Fig A2. Crisis Involvement and the Popular Vote Margin


























0 5 10 15 20 25
Popular Vote Margin




































0 5 10 15 20 25
Popular Vote Margin








































0 5 10 15 20 25
Popular Vote Margin
Linear Fit 95% CI
516 Electoral Margins and American Foreign Policy
The data in Figures A2 and A3 are less evenly distributed because crisis involvement and the use of force were rela-
tively less frequent events. It is notable in itself that there were no quarters in which there were substantially more such
engagements that could be driving the overall effect. It is also worth noting that the same presidents are not having the
same effect across all measures. For example, where G.W. Bush seemed to possibly be driving the findings in favor of
the hypothesis in Figure A1, the opposite seems to be the case in Figure A2. This implies that the attempt to bolster
robustness by turning to multiple dependent measures is working as anticipated.
Fixed Effects
In order to alleviate any remaining concerns about the impact of individual presidents on the aggregate findings, Table
A2 replicates the results using a time-series negative binomial model with presidential fixed effects. I leave out the Party,
Cold War and Jet variables because they do not vary within presidency. Again, the core results hold, though, unsurpris-
ingly, they are somewhat less statistically significant.
Table A2. Presidential Fixed Effects

































































N 58 58 58 3,716
(Notes: +< .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
Estimates for Models 1–6 are maximum likelihood coefficients obtained from negative binomial models with a quarterly unit of analysis. Estimates for Models 7
and 8 are maximum likelihood coefficients obtained from logistic models with the opportunity for the use of force as the unit of analysis. Standard errors (clus-
tered by president) in are parentheses. Constants are suppressed to conserve space.)
Erosion Parameters
In the primary analysis I multiply the margin of victory by a linear erosion parameter (time to the next election) in
order to capture the idea that the effect of an election probably declines over time. However, the results are not reliant
on this manipulation of the data. In Table A3, I replicate the key findings from Table 1 first with no erosion function
(Models 1–3) and then with an exponential erosion function, e)x (Models 4–6). The results are equivalent to those from
Table 1.
Table A3. Alternate Erosion Functions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Diplomacy Crisis Force Force ⁄Opp. Diplomacy Crisis Force Force ⁄Opp.
No erosion No erosion No erosion No erosion Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic
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Table A3(continued)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Diplomacy Crisis Force Force ⁄Opp. Diplomacy Crisis Force Force ⁄Opp.
No erosion No erosion No erosion No erosion Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic
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N 58 58 58 3,716 58 58 58 3,716
(Notes: +< 0.10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
Estimates for Models 1–3 and 5–7 are maximum likelihood coefficients obtained from negative binomial models with a quarterly unit of analysis. Estimates for
Models 4 and 8 are maximum likelihood coefficients obtained from logistic models with the opportunity for the use of force as the unit of analysis. Standard
errors (clustered by president) in are parentheses. Constants are suppressed to conserve space.)
Seemingly Unrelated Regression
Given the argument that presidents are trading off between foreign policy options, it is possible that the error terms of
the models on diplomacy, crisis intervention, and force could be correlated. In such a situation, estimating each equa-
tion separately ignores the information that comes from knowing that the error terms in the two equations are related
(Zellner 1962). In such instances seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) can be used to estimate the equations jointly. I
present SUR results in Table A4.23
Table A4. Seemingly Unrelated Regression Analysis





























































(Notes: Two tailed tests: +< 0.10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
N = 58 for all models. Table entries are coefficients obtained from seemingly unrelated regression analysis. The quarter is the unit of analysis. Standard errors are
in parentheses.)
The core findings hold and the Breusch-Pagan test is significant, providing evidence for the substitution effect that I
described in the theory section.
23 I do not employ SUR as the primary analysis in the article because it is
a modified OLS analysis, which is less appropriate for the count data that con-
stitute the primary dependant variables.
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